2011,07: Advertising, welfare economics and ethics by Steedman, Ian
Max Planck Institute of Economics 
Evolutionary Economics Group 
Kahlaische Str. 10  
07745 Jena, Germany 
Fax: ++49-3641-686868 
 
The Papers on Economics and Evolution are edited by the 
Evolutionary Economics Group, MPI Jena. For editorial correspondence, 
please contact: evopapers@econ.mpg.de 
 
ISSN 1430-4716 
 
 by the author 
 
 
# 1107 
 
 
Advertising, Welfare Economics and Ethics 
 
 
by 
 
Ian Steedman 
 
 
 #1107 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advertising, Welfare Economics and Ethics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ian Steedman 
 
 
Professor Emeritus, Manchester Metropolitan University 
 
Senior Research Fellow, William Temple Foundation 
 
Honorary Research Fellow, University of Chester 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I thank John Atherton, Stan Metcalfe, Hillel Steiner and participants at an MPG, Jena, 
seminar (May 2011) for encouragement and comments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 #1107 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
Advertising, Welfare Economics and Ethics 
 
Ian Steedman 
 
 
 
‘You cannot desire what you do not realise that you lack.’ 
(Diotima, in Plato’s Symposium.) 
 
 
‘… one of the most fundamental weaknesses of the market system is the use of 
persuasive influence by sellers upon buyers and a general excessive tendency to 
produce wants for goods rather than goods for the satisfaction of wants.’ 
(F. H. Knight, 1982 [1934].) 
 
 
‘… advertising … is measurable (in terms of resources expended on it), it is seldom 
consciously purchased, and it affects choices. There is thus no case for ignoring it’ 
(J. de V. Graaff, 1967.) 
 
Introduction 
 If Frank Knight, an acute observer of economic matters, was even 
approximately correct in the remark quoted above, then it is disappointing that over 
the nearly eighty subsequent years the ‘persuasive influence [of] sellers upon buyers’ 
has certainly not acquired a central place in standard analyses of exchange and 
production. (The recognition of selling costs in imperfect/monopolistic competition 
theory and the existence of specialized works on advertising do not contradict this.) 
How often, for example, does an Edgeworth Box analysis of exchange allow for the 
possibility that agents might use part of their endowment to alter, in their favour, the 
preferences of those with whom they exchange? Although ‘general’ equilibrium 
theory à la Debreu takes as data (a) the conditions of production, (b) resources, the 
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pattern of their ownership and the laws of property and (c) preferences, the purely 
relative nature of the grandiose adjective ‘general’ is widely acknowledged with 
respect to elements (a) and (b). Thus many economists reject (a) and study invention, 
innovation, technical progress, diffusion and so on; others waive aside (b) and study 
corruption, rent-seeking, directly unproductive profit-seeking, etc.. Now the use of 
resources to change preferences over goods and services is no less a fact of economic 
life than are, say, innovation and rent-seeking, yet element (c) is generally treated 
with far more deference than are elements (a) and (b). This constitutes a failure on the 
part of basic economic theorizing. ‘Preference-shifting’ uses of resources ought to be 
incorporated within our standard analyses of production, exchange and consumption. 
Part I of this exploratory paper will show how, to some extent at least, familiar 
explanatory tools of the economist’s trade can be modified to allow for the role of 
advertising (taken here to stand in for all forms of marketing, even though the former 
is, strictly speaking, only one form of the latter). Part II will then move on to consider 
both some simple implications for standard welfare economics and some broader 
ethical issues that welfare economics ought perhaps to incorporate by widening its 
(currently very narrow) scope.  
 
Part I. Familiar Economic Models 
 With no claim to have provided a full, let alone exhaustive treatment, we now 
seek to indicate how the role of sales promotion might be handled explicitly in some 
familiar kinds of simple economic model. The first is the two-commodity pure 
exchange analysis as presented in an Edgeworth box; the second is the two-period 
model of lending and borrowing; others introduce first labour, then labour and capital, 
and finally international trade. 
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a) Pure exchange 
 Figure 1 shows an Edgeworth exchange box with the origin for agent(s) A at 
the southwest corner and that for agent(s) B at the northeast corner. Point E is the 
endowment point and C the consumption point in the absence of sales promotion. 
(The absolute slope of EC is of course the commodity price ratio). Suppose now that 
by devoting the commodity vector ‘s’ to sales promotion – and thus having only the 
‘endowment’ EA left for consumption and trading – A can raise the exchange ratio to 
the absolute slope of the dashed line through EA. This will involve shifting B’s 
preferences towards the consumption of 1, which A is selling. A now consumes at CA, 
which is preferred to the situation at C. B’s new consumption bundle, at CB, is 
reached from CA by reversing the vector ‘s’; but it still lies on a (new) price line 
through E. It is thus shown how resource allocation has changed due to ‘sales’ activity 
by A. Note carefully that this is all to be interpreted in a strictly comparative statics 
manner; thus ‘A can raise the exchange ratio’ means ‘the exchange ratio is greater’, 
etc. 
 Encroaching somewhat on the discussion of Part II below, we notice at once 
that B consumes less of each commodity at CB than at C. Note, though, that Figure 1 
could have been so drawn that B consumes more of one commodity at CB than at C – 
this occurs if one commodity is so inferior for A that the reduction in its consumption 
by A exceeds the amount used up by A in ‘selling’ activities. 
 We shall return below to welfare assessments; more pressing here is the 
interpretation of Figure 1. If it be interpreted in terms of very many identical A’s and 
very many identical B’s an obvious ‘free-rider’ question arises. Why does not each 
individual A ‘leave it to the others’ to use ‘endowment’ for the purpose of sales 
promotion – with the result that none takes place? The discussion here could no doubt 
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go in various interesting directions – but our main object is simplicity in the 
introduction of our central concern within a broadly familiar analysis. We can proceed 
in either of two ways. In the first we take A to be a single agent. A has no ‘monopoly 
power’ in the usual sense, however, because – both in the absence and in the presence 
of sales promotion – all the B’s have identical preference maps consisting of parallel 
straight lines. (More pretentiously, identical CES utility functions of indefinitely large 
elasticity). Thus A has no power to influence the price ratio by selling more or selling 
less – but does have the ability to change, via sales promotion, the absolute slope of 
B’s indifference curves and thus the terms of trade. In the second interpretation, there 
are many competing A agents, producing an identical product, and the advertising for 
the generic product is carried out by a ‘trade association’, or by an agricultural 
‘marketing board’, or perhaps – in an international trade setting – by a government 
‘export promotion council.’ Stonier and Hague (1980) call this ‘promotional’ 
advertising  as opposed to ‘competitive’ advertising for the product of a specific firm. 
As an example of the former, they note that ‘in the UK there has been advertising by 
the whole hat-making industry, intended to increase sales of hats in general, not those 
of any one particular producer’ (p.221). Issues of financing, free-riding, etc. may still 
arise but we do not face them here. (We may note though that an advertisement by the 
British Potato Marketing Board, designed to promote the consumption of potatoes in 
general, was ‘funded by Britain’s potato farmers, packers, processors and 
merchants.’) 
 If the diagrammatic analysis is to be supplemented/replaced by an algebraic 
one, then the obvious tool to use is A’s indirect utility function. A particularly simple 
example  would be one in  which A’s  endowment consisted exclusively of 
commodity 1 and in which A’s objective was to choose ‘s’, to maximize: 
 #1107 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
   ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
αA
1α
2
-1
1
A
11A spse
pp
sepu −=−= α  
,where p ≡ (p1/p2) is increasing in s. Both in this particular example and in any more 
general one, it is important to consider the possibility of a corner solution, with s = 0. 
Simply to assume that p(s) is increasing in s is not to ensure, ipso facto, that sales 
promotion will be beneficial to A; the effect of s > 0 on the exchange ratio must be 
sufficiently great to overcompensate the negative impact effect on uA of the ‘loss of 
endowment’. More specifically, the condition is that, if p’’(s) < 0, 
 
 
This condition is more likely to be met the greater are (i) the importance of good 2 for 
A’s utility, (ii) A’s endowment of good 1 and (iii) the responsiveness of p to s. 
The interested reader is of course welcome to analyse in detail both this and 
more complicated examples, using general indirect utility functions, recalling Roy’s 
Identity and considering carefully when the optimal sales promoting use of A’s 
endowment will be zero. With respect to the p(s) relation, it might well be supposed 
that this is of the logistic /Gompertz/ Richard’s curve family. For example, one could 
assume that 
 
where p* > p (0). Or, more simply, one could assume that p(s) = p(0) for 0 ≤ s < s1, 
that p’(s) is positive and constant for s1 < s < s2 and that p(s) = p* for s2 ≤ s. Here, of 
course, it is not enough to consider p’(0) to determine whether s > 0 can be 
advantageous to A; uA(s) might fall, then rise, then fall again. 
 (It has been assumed above that the use of A’s resources in sales promotion, 
while it changes the terms of trade, leaves unchanged the direction, the pattern of 
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trade. It must be noted, therefore, that sales promotion might be able so to lower 
(p1/p2) that A could become better off than at C, in Figure 1, by selling commodity 2 
and buying commodity 1, thus reversing the no-sales-promotion pattern of trade). 
 It may be of interest to note that the condition for A to gain from selling 
activities is that the increase in the value of its (pre-advertising) sales of good 1 must 
exceed the value (in the new prices) of the resources devoted to advertising. In 
symbols:  
∆p (e1
A – c1A) > (p + ∆p) s1 + s2 
 At this point, any reader interested primarily in the welfare aspects of the 
argument could jump straight to section f) below, or even directly to Part II. For the 
reader who is also interested in extending our familiar explanatory arguments, 
however, we now turn to consider intertemporal exchange. 
 
b) Lending and borrowing 
 To derive a very simple account of how a lender might employ resources to 
increase the borrowers’ rate of time preference and hence the interest rate at which 
loans are made, one need only reinterpret Fig. 1 above. A becomes the lender, 
commodity 1 (2) becomes consumption ‘today’ (‘tomorrow’) and the absolute slopes 
of the price lines become (1 + the rate of interest). It will perhaps be natural now to 
suppose that A can use only ‘commodity 1’ as a means of increasing the absolute 
slopes of the borrowers’ linear indifference curves but the argument will otherwise be 
little changed. 
c) Labour services 
 Consider a producer – or perhaps a typical member of a cooperative of 
producers – who allocates each period of time T not only to leisure, l, and to 
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productive labour, lp, but also to ‘selling labour’, ls. (ls + lp + l = T). The agent seeks to 
maximize 
u = cγ lλ 
where c is consumption (of a single good, or a fixed proportions composite good, 
other than the one produced). Output of the produced good is lpα and hence 
c = (p0 + π ls) lpα 
where (p0 + π ls) is the price at which the good produced can be sold, per unit, when 
labour time ls is devoted to ‘sales’ activity. Hence 
u = (p0 + π ls)γ lpαγ lλ 
How should this agent allocate time so as to maximize u? 
 Provided that (π/p0)T  > [α + (λ/γ)], the following three positive l values, each 
less than T, will maximize u: 
[1 + α + (λ/γ)]ls   = T – [α + (λ/γ)] (po/π) 
                                [1 + α + (λ/γ)]lp      = α [T + (p0/π)] 
[1 + α + (λ/γ)]l               = (λ/γ) [T + (p0/π)] 
If the proviso does not hold, of course, this means that the ‘corner solution’ ls = 0 is 
best. For the interior solution described by our equations, the comparative statics are 
as follows: 
 ls lp l 
(π/po) + – – 
α – + – 
(λ/γ) – – + 
 
Labour time devoted to sales, ls, will be greater (i) the greater is the responsiveness of 
the selling price to sales effort (π/p0), (ii) the smaller is the elasticity of output w.r.t. 
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productive labour (α) and (iii) the smaller is the importance attached to leisure relative 
to consumption (λ/γ). 
 
d) Production with capital and wage-labour 
 Our next example of how ‘sales promotion’ may be incorporated into a simple 
piece of analysis considers a closed, one commodity economy in which production is 
by means of labour and the single, circulating capital good. Some amount of that 
capital good may be devoted, however, not to use in production but to changing 
workers’ preferences; more specifically, to lowering the constant real wage rate at 
which any amount of labour may be employed. We suppose that capital (K) is given 
and that only employment (L) and the amount of capital devoted to ‘sales promotion’ 
(S) are freely chosen.  
 Consider, then, the problem of choosing S and L to maximize: 
   Π = Q(K – S, L) – K – w(S) L 
, where Q ( ) is gross output and w (S) is the real product wage, which is decreasing in 
S. In obvious notation,  
   LΠ  = Q2 ( ) – w(S) ; SΠ = – Q1 ( ) – w 
/(S) L 
Now if   Q1 (K, L) > – w / (0) L 
then SΠ  will be negative at S = 0 and thus S = 0 may be part of the solution. 
However, a solution with S > 0 will be characterized by: 
   Q1 (K – S, L) = - w /(S) L 
and 
   Q2 (K – S,L) = w (S) 
[The second order conditions are Q11 ( ) < w //(S)L, Q22 ( ) < 0  and  
[Q11 – w //(S) L] Q22 ≥ [Q12 + w / (S)]2 
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Note that Q11 < 0 and Q11 Q22 ≥ Q122 may not be required]. 
 To illustrate, suppose that Q ( ) = (K – S)(1-α) Lα and w (S) = w0e-βS,  where  
β > 0 < α < 1. When the first order conditions both hold as equalities, the second order 
conditions are met and we find that  
   S = K - 





αβ
α-1      (1) 
, so that S is increasing in α, β and K. (All intuitively understandable findings). It is of 
course implicit in (1) that α K β < (1-α) is the condition for a corner solution with      
S = 0. For S > 0, it is not enough that this can lower the real wage (β > 0); it must 
lower it sufficiently to offset the withdrawal of capital from production. 
 The level of employment is given by  
( )( ) ( )
( )





 −
−= α
-1
βK
α1-1
0 eα)-(1βLw
α
αα α  
and, unsurprisingly, L is decreasing in w0 but increasing in both β and K. Now in an 
otherwise identical economy in which β (and hence S) were zero, we should have  
w0 (L0 / K)(1-α) = α  and it can be shown that  
   L > L0 
It can be shown too that gross output 
   Q > Q0 
and that the aggregate wage bill 
   W > W0 
By comparison with the β = 0 economy (or indeed a β > 0 = S economy), the with-
sales-promotion economy has higher output (gross and net), higher employment and 
higher aggregate wages. Needless to say, no one in their right mind will wish to relate 
this result directly to claims that, in the US economy for example, workers would be 
better off both working and consuming less. And this not only because of the extreme 
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simplicity of the model analysed here. Even within this type of model, the findings in 
question are specific to the particular example given and cannot be generalized. (To 
see this, draw a simple diagram showing, for S = 0, the falling marginal product of 
labour curve intersecting a horizontal line at height w0. Now suppose that, with S > 0, 
both the MPL curve and the fixed real wage rate ‘fall’. It will be seen at once that L 
may rise, fall or remain unchanged; and that, if L rises, then W may rise, fall or 
remain unchanged). 
 
e) ‘Ricardian’ trade theory 
 Consider the textbook travesty of Ricardo’s ‘Chapter 7’ theory of trade, with 
two countries (A and B) and two commodities (1 and 2). The total labour supplies are 
LA and LB and the unit labour costs satisfy (l1A/l2A) < (l1B/l2B), so that A has the 
comparative advantage in producing 1. To keep matters simple, we shall assume that, 
with or without ‘sales’ activity, both countries will be fully specialized when trading. 
Let demand conditions in A be represented by UA = C1Aα1. C2Aα2 and those in B by  
UB = C1Bβ1. C2Bβ2 If l1A Q1A ≡ LA and l2B Q2B ≡ LB  then (α1 + α2)C1A = α1 Q1A and  
(β1 + β2)C2B = β2 Q2B. The ‘no advertising’ terms of trade, p, are given by 
α2 (β1 + β2)Q1A p = β1 (α1 + α2)Q2B 
and it follows that, with ‘no advertising’ trade, lnUA is proportional to  
. 
 
 Consider now an alternative ‘with advertising’ trade equilibrium in which A’s 
‘export promotion council’ devotes amount S of Q1A to making (β1/β1 + β2) greater 
than it would have been in the absence of advertising. Then uA will be 
(Q1A – S) (α1+ α2) β(S)α2 
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where β ≡ (β1/β1 + β2) is increasing in S. It could be, for example, that 
 
where β(0) <  β* < 1. In this case, uA is increasing with S, at S = 0, when 
 
, so that this is certainly a sufficient condition for S > 0 to occur. It is less obvious that 
it is a necessary condition, however. β/(S) is increasing up to ebS = [β*/β(0)], so that 
there is the possibility that UA may fall, rise and fall again as S increases. If this 
indeed occurs and if the local maximum is the global maximum then it will illustrate a 
strong form of ‘increasing returns’ to selling activity; a little such activity might make 
A worse off and yet substantial such activity might make A better off than in the ‘no 
advertising’ situation. Note that if β(S) is a step-function, with β jumping from β(0) to 
β* at S=S, then it is certainly possible for S=S to be UA maximizing, even though a 
‘small’ value of S would reduce UA below UA(0). The same must be true for a 
piecewise-linear β(S) with a steep enough middle section. 
 
f) A small open (H-O-S) economy 
 We may now consider a small open economy in which production is carried 
out by means of land and labour (à  la Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson). The country’s 
terms of trade are independent of its volume of trade but they can be influenced by 
devoting amounts (Ts, Ls) of land and labour to sales (export) promotion activities. 
Just how this is organized to circumvent the free-rider problem and how the export 
promotion is financed may, of course, be important issues but we shall not pursue 
them here. Nor shall we go into any detail about the relative ‘land-labour-intensities’ 
 #1107 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 14 
of the three activities of producing commodity 1, producing commodity 2 and 
promoting exports of  commodity 1 (say). 
 In Fig. 2 the solid curve and line represent the no-sales-promotion production 
possibility frontier and terms of trade line; P0 is the output point and C0 the 
consumption point. When resources (Ts, Ls) are devoted to export promotion, 
however, the production possibility frontier moves inward to be represented by the 
dashed curve and the terms of trade line becomes the (steeper) dashed line; P and C 
are the new production and consumption points and C is preferred to C0. Of course, it 
might be that no positive use of resources in sales promotion could yield a C preferred 
to C0; a ‘corner solution’ might be optimal, with TS = 0 = LS.1
  A more formal examination of the issue leads to many conditions 
familiar to any trade theorist – and to the following less familiar one (in which p ≡ 
(p1/p2) is the terms of trade); 
 
   
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Unfamiliar as it may be, the first element of this condition for an interior solution will 
immediately be understood. [It can in fact be shown that  
 
 
 
where C1 is the country’s consumption of 1 (so that (Q1 – C1) is its exports of 1), r is 
the land-rent and w is the wage-rate]. 
                                                 
1 Our references to trade theory might well provoke the reader into thinking about the effects of sales 
promotion in terms of the offer curve diagram. And this could lead to thoughts about retaliation and 
advertising (as opposed to tariff) ‘wars’. The ability to advertise may often be asymmetrical, however – 
as in the case of section d) above involving capitalists and workers. 
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 Note that this H-O-S example highlights the fact that, when resources can be 
used to change prices, the Separation Theorem no longer holds. 
 
 Simple – perhaps over simple – as the above six models may be, they may 
serve to indicate that it is not so difficult to integrate one kind of sales-promoting use 
of resources into very familiar forms of elementary economic analysis and hence that 
there is no excuse for avoiding such integration. They do nothing, however, to show 
how such use of resources may affect the necessary forms of argument in normative 
assessment of alternative economic states, the matter to which we now turn. 
 
Part II. Welfare Economics and Ethics 
 To begin this Part, let us return to Figures 1 and 2 supposing that both 
commodities are superior for A (as shown in the figures) and bearing firmly in mind 
that our analysis here is of a purely comparative statics nature and refers only to 
Stonier and Hague’s ‘promotional’ advertising (for A’s generic product), or to the 
special case in which B has straight-line indifference curves. Since total endowments 
– whether of commodities, as in Fig. 1, or of primary inputs, as in Fig.2 – are the 
same in the no-advertising and with-advertising situations, and since A consumes 
more of both commodities in the latter situation than in the former, it follows at once 
that B consumes less of both commodities in the presence of advertising. Thus 
whether the two situations are compared, from B’s standpoint, in terms of B’s no-
advertising preferences  or B’s with-advertising preferences – or, indeed, any standard 
preferences – B is worse off in the presence of advertising. A is better-off at B’s 
expense; we are not dealing here with a Pareto improvement, with mutually beneficial 
exchange. 
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 Is B nevertheless better off in the with-advertising situation than in the no-
exchange (autarky) situation? Consider the case in which advertising provokes a 
change in the slope of B’s straight-line indifference curves. In terms of the with-
advertising  preferences, B is indifferent between the with-advertising and no-
exchange situations. In terms of the no-advertising  preferences, B is actually worse 
off in the former than in the latter situation. There thus appears to be  no sense, within 
the present analysis, in which advertising is ‘good news’ for B. But if there thus exist 
circumstances in which economic activity is not to the mutual advantage of all the 
participants, this fact ought to be standardly acknowledged within basic economic 
theory, whether by means of such diagrams as Figures 1 and 2, or otherwise.2
 
 
Public goods, externalities, market power and classical liberalism 
 Could it perhaps be argued that standard economic theory does in fact 
adequately capture the issues just mentioned, under one or more of the headings listed 
in the title of this section? The following discussion is particularly tentative and 
reactions to it will be very welcome.  
(a) Consider display advertising on hoardings, or billboards (as opposed to 
advertising in magazines, or on the internet). It is non-rival and non-excludable in 
‘consumption’. It is also what Gravelle and Rees (1992, p.525) call ‘non-optional’ in 
their discussion of public goods; as they put it, a radio or television broadcast is 
optional, while defence is non-optional. Thus display advertising has some common 
                                                 
2 When this paper was presented at the Jena seminar, Werner Guth reminded us all of another possible 
situation in which ‘A’ could benefit at the expense of ‘B’. If the A agents costlessly  destroy part of 
their endowments (overcoming somehow the free-rider problem), they might improve their terms of 
trade sufficiently to more than offset their ‘loss’ of endowment, so that they consume more of both 
commodities than they would have done in the absence of such destruction. Clearly, then, the B agents 
now consume less of each commodity – and the A’s have gained at the expense of the B’s. Even if the 
law permits one to destroy one’s own property, not everyone will judge it to be morally acceptable that 
the A’s have advantaged themselves in this way. 
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features with a non-optional public good (such as defence provision). Of course, 
different people may judge the advertisement differently, some finding it informative 
and/or attractive, while others find it irritating, intrusive or even vulgar; some may see 
it as a ‘good’, others as a ‘bad’. But equally, a strict pacifist might see all defence 
spending as bad, while an opponent of nuclear weapons might see some but not all 
such expenditure as bad. Can display advertising then be assimilated to the category 
of non-optional public goods? Certainly one could not apply straightforwardly the 
textbook analysis of the optimal provision of a public good, since that presupposes 
given preferences for both (all) agents, whilst the very point of advertising is to 
change preferences over commodities (whether or not they are changed over 
characteristics). Less fundamentally, we may note that advertising does not raise the 
same issues of financing as does a typical public good. 
(b) Markets work best when agents are well informed and information has, of 
course, some public good aspects. In so far as advertising diffuses information – and 
some have argued that consumers today are (or at least can be) better informed than 
ever before – it can be brought under this familiar economic heading. But we shall 
return to this below. 
(c) An externality is defined by Gravelle and Rees (p.517) as existing ‘if some of 
the variables which affect one decision-maker’s utility or profit are under the control 
of another decision-maker.’ Mankiw and Taylor (2010, p.189) give a slightly different 
emphasis, writing that, ‘An externality arises when a person engages in an activity 
that influences the well-being of a bystander and yet neither pays nor receives any 
compensation for that effect.’ 
Now advertising is certainly something under the control of one decision-
maker that can influence the utility/the well-being of another decision-maker. We 
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note, though, that the one influenced is no ‘bystander’ – not a mere third party – but is 
someone that the other decision-maker is aiming to affect. Moreover, the latter 
decision-maker, the advertiser, most certainly aims to be (more than) compensated for 
the cost of the advertising. (In practice, advertising expenditure may be a cost with a 
particularly uncertain return – but we are not facing that (important) issue here.) Thus 
while advertising introduces, by its very nature, agent interdependence, it is not 
obvious that the familiar concept of a (beneficial or harmful) externality is well suited 
to deal with it (whether a pecuniary or technical externality). 
d) A standard topic within the economic discussion of advertising is whether it 
increases market power, for example by increasing brand loyalty and/or strengthening 
entry barriers. Important as these matters may be, however, they would not appear to 
cohere well with the discussion of Part I, with its emphasis on ‘promotional’ 
advertising, or a monopolist selling to consumers with straight line indifference 
curves. That discussion claims only to be an introduction to the matter of advertising, 
after all, and we are here simply recognizing one aspect of its restricted nature. 
e) Classical liberal defences of the market system are not, of course, greatly impressed 
by Paretian welfare economies in any case, so they are not going to be that interested 
in whether or not promotional advertising can be shown to create difficulties for that  
style of welfare reasoning. But such authors as Friedman (1962) and Kirkpatrick 
(1994) certainly do defend advertising, claiming that non-fraudulent free activity must 
be acceptable. (See also Brenkert, 2008, pp.147-9, on the ‘commercial free speech’ 
defence of advertising, sometimes linked to the U.S. First Amendment. It is relevant 
here that it can be ethical to refrain from exercising a legal right.) 
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Welfare, advertising and the characteristics model 
 We turn now to consider in terms of Lancaster’s ‘characteristics’ model, first, 
sales promotion that gives true information about commodities (in place of potential 
purchasers’ vague or false beliefs about them)3
 
 and, second, sales promotion that 
seeks to change the public’s preferences over characteristics. (In both cases, of course, 
preferences over commodities can be expected to change but it is not immediately 
obvious that one must evaluate both kinds of sales promotion in the same way).  
(i) Provision of true information 
 How is one to make a welfare, or an ethical comparison of two alternative 
economic equilibria which differ because in one of them resources are being used to 
make some of the agents’ preferences different from what they would have been in 
the absence of such resource use? By definition, one cannot adopt a straightforward 
Paretian Welfare Economics approach; the very nature of the difference between the 
alternatives renders that approach inapplicable. One might of course assess the two 
alternatives from both the perspective of the unchanged preferences and that of the 
altered preferences, hoping that the two rankings will be the same (as in Fig.1and 
Fig.2). But they may not be. 
 More fundamentally, perhaps, there is a problem even if the two rankings 
agree. Suppose that sales promotion activity induces a preference ordering over 
commodities based on true beliefs about commodities and characteristics, whilst the 
no-advertising ordering is based on (at least partly) false beliefs. James Griffin (1986) 
                                                 
3 We refer to giving true information – and not merely to giving ‘more accurate’ information – because 
it has been shown, in Currie and Steedman (2000), that more accurate but still inaccurate information 
can have surprising implications for consumer welfare. (See below on ‘complete’ information.) With 
reference back to Part I, note that Lancaster’s assumption of linear relations between commodity and 
characteristics quantities combines easily with an assumption of straight line indifference curves over 
the latter, to yield similar indifference curves over the former. One can then consider simultaneously 
the influence of advertising on consumer beliefs and on deep-level preferences. 
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has argued, plausibly enough, that the satisfaction of ‘well-informed preferences’ is 
more valuable than that of ill-informed preferences. Does this mean that only the 
with-advertising  ranking of alternatives is to be reckoned into one’s overall 
assessment? Suppose that situation P is marginally better than situation Q, according 
to the well-informed ordering, but far worse than Q, according to the ill-informed 
ordering; how are the two rankings to be combined into an overall judgement? 
 Be that as it may, there is a further type of question to be asked, one that lies 
well beyond the boundaries of Paretian Welfare Economics. As McPherson (1987, p. 
402) pointed out, when alternative preference orderings are at issue, procedural 
questions come to the fore and one must ask not only what preferences happen to be 
but also how they came to be as they are. In the present context, does it matter 
(ethically), for example, that the sales promoters have provided correct information 
because it is in their own interest to do so? Can they properly be criticized for ‘acting 
selfishly’? Or is this rather a matter in which everyone is made better off – the sales 
promoters by increasing their levels of preference satisfaction and others by becoming 
better informed? In so far as the answer is ‘Yes’, does this offset – partially or fully – 
any reduction in the preference satisfaction levels of the ‘others’ (as in Fig.1 and 
Fig.2)? 
 A failure to provide true information, on the part of sales promoters, can 
sometimes provoke strong criticism, the ‘caveat emptor’ notion notwithstanding. 
(Implying that the provision of true information is approved of).Think for example of 
the fierce arguments that raged around the issue of cigarette promotion and the 
(statistical) relationship between smoking and certain kinds of illness. Yet it is 
impossible (logically impossible) to provide a ‘complete’ description of any 
commodity, so that (sensible) criticism can only be to the effect that 
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‘significant/relevant’ true information has been withheld. How is this to be defined 
and by whom? Such issues, it need hardly be said, are commonplace in both popular 
thought and the law courts; should they not also be standard fare within basic welfare 
economics? Their treatment, it is true, requires both that deliberately induced (or not 
induced) differences in preferences over commodities be considered and that account 
be taken of the possibility that a resource owner may have a moral obligation to use 
resources for the benefit of others. (i.e., to use resources in providing true information 
to others). Basic welfare economics will then need to be conceived of rather more 
generously than in strict Paretian Welfare Economics – but what of that? The 
discipline is to be designed to deal with reality; reality is not to be seen with blinkers 
so that it fits into a Procrustean Welfare Economics. (It is not implied that a wider 
ranging welfare economics will be perfectly simple to construct; nor that there are no 
relevant elements already to hand in the literature of economics). 
 Important as it may be to consider how well pre-given preferences over 
commodities are satisfied, responsible assessment of economic systems cannot be 
confined to such consideration. For it is just a fact that resources are used to change 
preferences over commodities.. It is true both that a more ambitious welfare 
economics will go against the grain of economists’ traditional caution in such matters 
and that that caution has a defensible (anti-paternalist) background. But even the 
cautious nature of Paretian Welfare Economics is not entirely uncontentious, since not 
every change making each and every individual better off will be regarded as an 
overall improvement by a strict egalitarian. (For example, the change from (1,10) to 
(1.001,100)). And it hardly furthers the cause of anti-paternalism simply to refuse to 
recognize that resources are being used to influence the preferences of others. Cutting 
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against the grain or no, we have a responsibility to open up welfare economics in 
order to assess the realities we face. 
 
(ii) Influencing deep-level preferences. 
 We now consider sales promoting activities that make a difference not to 
beliefs about the relations between commodities and characteristics but, rather, to 
preferences over characteristics. While both kinds of sales promotion may equally 
affect preferences over commodities they may not be ethically equivalent. (On 
September 19th, 1786, while in Italy, Goethe wrote that, ‘One gets small thanks from 
people when one tries to improve their moral values, to give them a higher conception 
of themselves and a sense of the truly noble’.)  
It is probably not that difficult, in many cases at least, to identify true beliefs 
about commodities and characteristics. But how far could even a determined moral 
realist go in maintaining that there is a true ranking of states of being and of actions 
and hence, derivatively, of commodity characteristics? How far is there an analogue 
here to ‘well-informed’ preferences? Such questions might appear to be overblown, 
even pretentious in the present context; not a great deal of sales promotion refers to 
ultimate values, or to the relations between Goodness and Beauty, or between Justice 
and Mercy! Nevertheless, they should not be brushed aside too easily. As Wicksteed, 
for example, made very clear, there is no sharp dividing line between the deepest 
ethical questions and the query ‘What ought I to be doing with my time?’, or between 
that query and the modest, ‘What shall I buy?’ The world of practical reason is not 
ultimately compartmentalized, even if we do tend to focus our attention on one level 
at a time. And if sales promotion does not commonly give lectures on ultimate values, 
it can and sometimes does endorse – perhaps implicity – the idea that some emphases 
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in life are of great importance, whilst leaving other – and perhaps equally or even 
more valuable – emphases unmentioned. Is there anything wrong with this? If ‘strong 
moral realism’ is correct and if we can know the moral truth then the answer is, 
presumably, ‘It is wrong to endorse moral falsehood – just as it would be to purvey 
false information about commodities’. Perhaps the satisfaction of vicious preferences 
is no better than that of ill-informed preferences? (There are, of course, moral realism 
traditions according to which ‘bad’ actions are always ‘ignorant’ actions). 
How do matters stand, though, if  we do not know the moral truth – and do not even 
know what would be the derived ‘correct’ preference ordering over characteristics? 
[Aside: To speak of ‘preference’ may seem odd here – we don’t have preferences over 
truths! How is one to relate moral truths re states of being and re actions, on the one 
hand, to idiosyncratic ‘tastes’ and ‘preferences’, on the other? Perhaps these latter 
refer only to matters that are ‘indifferent’ or ‘adiaphoros’ in terms of the former? And 
note the claim of von Wright (1987, p.944) that ‘the value – absolutes [of goodness 
and badness] cannot be defined in terms of preference alone.’]  
Can there be anything wrong with influencing a deeper-level preference 
ordering, even if there is no such thing as a correct or true deeper-level ordering? 
Some will say that there can, on the grounds that such influence violates the 
autonomy of  preference-holders (or the authenticity of their actions). Thus Crisp 
(1987), for example, insists that many have – and all ought to have (p.415) – ‘a strong 
second order desire not to be manipulated by others without our knowledge, and for 
no good reason’ (p.414). Persuasion is not necessarily wrong – and if we attend a 
film, a play, a sermon or a lecture we may be glad to be persuaded. But persuasive 
advertising, Crisp argues, is not always comparable to these cases and can involve an 
assault on our (Kantian) autonomy, in which we are treated simply as a means and not 
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at all as ends. ‘ It seems, then, that persuasive advertising does override the autonomy 
of consumers, and that, if the overriding  of autonomy, other things being equal, is 
immoral, then persuasive advertising is immoral’ (pp.416-7). (See also Chryssides 
and Kaler, 1996, pp.128-9; Velasquez, 1998, pp.347-9; Crane and Matten, 2004, 
pp.87-90.) We may, of course, ask whether all consumers are innocent dupes whose 
values can be led this way and that without their conscious participation in the value 
changing process? The answer to this last question may well be, ‘No, not all. But 
some are more easily swayed than others, and not only children.’ (Cf, Griffiths and 
Lucas, 1996, p.108.)  In so far as this is true, with respect to which consumers is the 
acceptability or otherwise of value-changing sales promotion to be assessed? And do 
consumers themselves have a responsibility to appraise – and where appropriate reject 
– such sales promotion? (Cf, Brenkert, 2008, pp.140-144.) 
 If and when it is wrong to attempt to influence the deeper-level preferences of 
others, can making such an attempt be harmful to those who make it? Does it, or can 
it at least, encourage in them a cynical, manipulative mentality, with the result that the 
activity in question harms them ethically even as it is profitable to them? 
 Such questions may not be easy to answer. But that does not make them non-
questions. Their answers are relevant to assessment of the use of resources to affect 
others’ preferences – and the familiar armoury of Paretian Welfare Economics 
provides little enough help in finding those answers. We shall have to move beyond 
its cautious constructions if we are to build a welfare economics capable of dealing 
with the type of resource use at issue here. 
Other thoughts 
 (i) Much sales promotion, of various types, is such that it is seen and/or heard 
by many who have no wish to see or hear it; even by many who dislike intensely the 
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seeing and/or the hearing of it. To the more sensitive (?), it is sometimes a serious 
‘negative externality’ that they are unable to avoid having their minds filled by (what 
is to them) garbage. Sir John Hicks once likened the ‘right to advertise’ to ‘freedom of 
speech’; but any legal right to advertise on bill boards and the sides of buses and taxis 
can limit our ability to move around in public spaces free from visual pollution. Any 
right to ‘cold call’ is incompatible with a right to freedom from unwanted invasion of 
one’s privacy at home. The legal right to track our internet searches and to direct 
internet advertisements accordingly can be seen as an invasion of privacy – and this 
has become a contentious issue in the U.S.A. (See Advertising Age (2010, September 
20th, pp.24-5.) Various asserted ‘rights’ in such matters may simply not be 
compossible. (See, again, Brenkert, 2008, pp.147-9 on ‘commercial free speech’.) 
 Of course, some people may on occasion benefit from seeing billboards, or 
even from a ‘cold call’. And, sadly, it seems that some find sales promoting activities 
‘entertaining’; if conversant with the terminology, they could thus say that there is a 
‘positive externality’ to some sales promotion. How could one reach an overall 
assessment of the just - mentioned negative and positive externalities without making 
a value judgement as to the relative worth of freedom from degrading visual and aural 
pollution, on the one side, and utterly trivial, mind-numbing entertainment, on the 
other (to put it in strictly neutral terms)? 
 (ii) Consider a sales promotion activity which suggests that some particular 
commodity has the characteristic of ‘being very much in fashion’. If this is widely 
believed, the suggestion might become a truth, even if it had not been one initially. 
Suppose, in fact, that it is at first a falsehood but becomes a truth; how would a useful 
welfare economics assess this sales promotion activity? It is a commonplace that the 
market works best in a context of trust and truth-telling – but here a falsehood 
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becomes a truth. Can the sales promotion involved be criticized both on the grounds 
that it began with the dissemination of falsehood and on the grounds that this fact will 
have tended to undermine trust (despite the eventual truth of the ‘fashionability’ 
claim)? Whatever the correct answer, this type of question is relevant to the welfare 
and ethical assessment of the economies we actually live in and hence it is not 
responsible to imprison ourselves within a form of welfare economics inherently 
incapable of responding to such questions. 
 (iii) The above reference to fashion may give rise to thoughts about how 
advertising relates to desires for novelty and/or conformity to social norms; and about 
whether it can affect aspiration levels, with implications for a ‘satisficing’ approach to 
human action. Needless to say, such thoughts may not all find a ready home in the 
profit maximizing, utility maximizing, comparative statics analysis of Part I above. 
But that is no reason for declining to entertain such thoughts if they help us to think 
clearly about a world shot through with uncertainty and with (deliberately created) 
novelty. (Cf, Witt, 2009, pp.370-371.) The arguments of Part I are intended to inch 
familiar analyses towards reality, not to create new straightjackets on thought! It 
would indeed be ironic to associate advertising too strongly with certainty, since there 
seems to be strong agreement about the uncertainty of the actual effects of 
advertising. (Recall John Wanamaker’s quip, ‘I know half my advertising is wasted, I 
just don’t know what half’.) 
 Is advertising the worst possible source of information about improved or new 
commodities – except, that is, for all the alternatives, which are even worse? Discuss, 
using the tools of welfare economics! 
 (iv) A common complaint about sales promotion relates not to any particular 
advertisement but, rather, to the pervasive, intrusive ‘environment’ created by the 
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collective mass of advertisements of various kinds, an environment which is said to 
foster a mind-set directed towards a specific – and limited – view of human values, of 
what matters in life. If the proponents of such a complaint are not merely claiming 
that ‘other people’ are thus affected (they themselves being immune), the complaint is 
perhaps to some extent self-validating. But the questions remain – how do we know? 
How do we assess the extent of such an effect? How do we evaluate it? Whatever the 
answers may be, the complaint is relevant to welfare assessments of the market 
system, yet cannot be faced within welfare economics as we now know it. That is not 
something we can be proud of. 
 
Concluding remarks 
 Since resources are in fact employed to make a difference to others’ 
preferences over commodities, basic economic theory, both explanatory and 
evaluative, should be able to deal with that issue. It has been suggested in Part I  that, 
in some simple forms at least, the matter is tractable with respect to explanatory 
analysis. (We did not of course claim to go very far in this regard). In Part II, we were 
less able to be constructive in regard to evaluative analysis but did indicate clearly, we 
hope, that there are good reasons for saying that a responsible welfare economics, 
able to give guidance in the assessment of  real world economic processes, has not 
only to step outside the confines of Paretian Welfare Economics but to grapple with 
inherently more difficult – and perhaps more contentious – ethical questions than 
welfare economists have recently been in the habit of facing. 
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